REPORT OF FATAL ACCIDENT

REPORT OF FATAL ACCIDENT 1999

Name of Victim: William Kroh

Address: Girardville
Name of Mine: Lincoln #3 Strip

Permit: 54860109

County: Schuylkill

Name of Company: Harriman Coal Corporation

Date of Accident: May 17, 1999

DESCRIPTION
On Monday, May 17, 1999, an accident occurred while excavating the north spoil bank of the Lincoln #3 strip operation resulting in death of William Kroh. The victim, age 29, was married with one child and was employed as an equipment operator for 10 months and 4 days.
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
Mr. Kroh was excavating the north spoil bank with a Cat 5130 hydraulic front shovel when a portion, approximately 80 feet (24,384 meters ) of the unstable slope created by the excavation slid on the cab burying Mr. Kroh. The victim was completely buried in the excavator he was operating and died from blunt trauma and asphyxiation.
RECOMMENDATION
Additional training for operators utilizing this type of equipment. An adequate ground control plan. A complete examination should have been made to determine the area as safe.

REPORT OF FATAL ACCIDENT 1999
Name of Victim:	Lee E. Messner
Name of Mine:	Paradise Quarry
Name of Company:	Independence Construction Materials
Date of Accident:	December 21, 1999

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT

On Tuesday, December 21, 1999, a flyrock incident occurred at the Paradise Quarry. A man was injured and later died of internal injuries. The victim, Lee E. Messner, age 32, was married with one child and was employed as an equipment operator for approximately 7 years.
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
The direct cause of the accident was flyrock which was believed to come from angle holes that were drilled in face row holes. The primary crusher area was evacuated, but the road was blocked by the victims pick-up truck situated next to the primary crusher. The quarry superintendent told the blaster-in-charge that the primary crusher area had been evacuated and that the area was clear to blast. The blaster-in-charge could not see the primary crusher area and did not know that the superintendent and crusher operator had returned to the primary crusher area before the blast. A baseball size rock came through the victim’s windshield hitting the man in the side causing internal injuries to the kidneys, lungs and liver.
RECOMMENDATION
Operator will submit a written plan as to how they will provide safer environments for road guards and quarry personnel during future blasts. All personnel will be evacuated to the shop area and accounted for before future blasts.The blaster-in-charge’s license will be suspended for an undetermined time that has not yet been set by the Department.

REPORT OF FATAL ACCIDENT 1999
Name of Victim:	Robert J. Francisco
Name of Mine:	DiAnne
Name of Company:	Canterbury Coal Co.
Date of Accident:	December 22, 1999

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
On Wednesday, December 22, 1999, a roof fall accident occurred in the #23 room of the M-2 working section of the DiAnne Mine causing the death of Robert J. Francisco. The cut was being mined in a 4-lift sequence. The number three cut lift sequence was mined in 45 feet on the right side and the mining machine was moved to the left side to start lift sequence number four. The victim, age 47, was using a remote control to position the tail of the continuous miner to load a shuttle car when the roof fell onto the continuous miner and the victim. The rock measured approximately 18 feet wide, 16 feet long and 0 to 6 inches thick. The victim had 14 years of experience as a continuous miner operator.
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
The roof fall accident occurred in the #23 room of the M-2 working section of the DiAnne mine under the following conditions: The continuous miner operator was positioned inby the last row of roof supports and under unsupported roof. Prior to mining a deep cut, markers were not placed on the second outby row of roof bolts. The probe provided for methane examinations were 36 feet 7 inches in length. The approved plan requires a 40 foot probe. Cut sequence #3 on the right side was mined 45 foot deep. Maximum depth of cut approved with shuttle cars is 37 feet. The line brattice was not maintained within 40 feet of the face. Line brattice was back 45 feet during mining. During the mining of cut sequence #3, the shuttle car operator’s workstation was by the last row of roof supports and under unsupported roof. Rooms were being developed on 45 by 60 foot centers. Mining a 45 foot cut in #23 room would make an air connection in one cut, and save a follow-up move back into #23 room. The mining projections could have contributed to cut depths exceeding 37 feet. RECOMMENDATION All employees must be retrained on the approved roof control/deep cut mining plan before returning to work. Probes used for methane examination must be 3 feet longer than the maximum depth of cut to be mined. The certified section foreman must see that the markers are hung prior to mining and all provisions of the approved deep cut/scrubber mining plans are in compliance. Entry and crosscut center should be designed to not encourage cut depths in excess of approved distances. Administrative action should be taken against the two shuttles car operators who participated in the violations related to this accident.

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REPORT OF FATAL ACCIDENT 1999
Name of Victim:	William Kroh
Address:	Girardville
Name of Mine:	Lincoln #3 Strip
Permit:	54860109
County:	Schuylkill
Name of Company:	Harriman Coal Corporation
Date of Accident:	May 17, 1999

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
On Tuesday, December 21, 1999, a flyrock incident occurred at the Paradise Quarry. A man was injured and later died of internal injuries. The victim, Lee E. Messner, age 32, was married with one child and was employed as an equipment operator for approximately 7 years.
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
The direct cause of the accident was flyrock which was believed to come from angle holes that were drilled in face row holes. The primary crusher area was evacuated, but the road was blocked by the victims pick-up truck situated next to the primary crusher. The quarry superintendent told the blaster-in-charge that the primary crusher area had been evacuated and that the area was clear to blast. The blaster-in-charge could not see the primary crusher area and did not know that the superintendent and crusher operator had returned to the primary crusher area before the blast. A baseball size rock came through the victim’s windshield hitting the man in the side causing internal injuries to the kidneys, lungs and liver.
RECOMMENDATION
Operator will submit a written plan as to how they will provide safer environments for road guards and quarry personnel during future blasts. All personnel will be evacuated to the shop area and accounted for before future blasts.The blaster-in-charge’s license will be suspended for an undetermined time that has not yet been set by the Department.